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Showing posts with label Truth in Lending Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Truth in Lending Act. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 25, 2026

Will AI Reduce Fair Lending Violations?

YOUR COMPLIANCE QUESTION 

Our company is building an AI engine to monitor for fair lending violations. The AI system is extensive and includes chatbots. It will be integrated into our LOS and several other systems. We are a large mortgage originator and servicer. We use one of the most well-known platforms for loan originating and servicing. The system offers several new AI features. But we ran our own test against the LOS and found that our AI engine is identifying more fair lending issues than the one embedded in the LOS. 

As the company's General Counsel and Chief Risk Officer, I was shocked that building our own AI system could produce better results than a highly rated, well-established LOS. Granted, our AI system is proprietary and reflects our unique compliance needs. Full disclosure: We have been a client of yours for over 15 years, and we have discussed these and other AI findings with your team in order to mitigate compliance risk. 

I wonder if a one-size-fits-all AI integration in the LOS can really be effective, given that fair lending involves many state and federal regulations. We are testing and monitoring our AI integration, but many companies lack the resources we have and will rely on their LOS provider's results. 

Do you think a generic AI system can reduce fair lending violations? 

Signed, 

Risk Averse 

OUR COMPLIANCE SOLUTION 

AI POLICY PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE BANKING™ 

Our AI Policy Program aligns with Freddie Mac's AI governance requirements for Freddie Mac Sellers/Servicers. Responsible AI practices can help align AI system design, development, and use with applicable legal and regulatory guidelines. 

Our AI Policy Program consists of the following policies: 

1.      Artificial Intelligence Governance Policy

2.      Artificial Intelligence Use Policy

3.      Artificial Intelligence Workplace Policy

4.      Artificial Intelligence Credit Underwriting Policy

5.      Artificial Intelligence Do & Do Not Policy

6.      Artificial Intelligence Ethics Policy

7.      Artificial Intelligence Vendor Management Policy 

Contact us for the presentation and pricing 

RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION 

Let me begin with my conclusion: there is currently no one-size-fits-all, generic AI system that can be thoroughly relied on to reduce fair lending violations. 

Most companies will rely on originating and servicing platforms that integrate AI into fair lending analytics. Unfortunately, companies are generally liable for AI errors, particularly when AI causes financial losses, safety issues, or provides consumers with false information. Legal responsibility typically falls on the business deploying the technology, even if it properly monitors, tests, or ensures that the AI is fit for fair lending detection. 

Legal and Regulatory Risk 

Put another way, your business is responsible for any misinformation provided by your AI chatbots. As you likely know, there are certain aspects of tort law, like duty of care, that require individuals and entities to act with reasonable care to avoid causing foreseeable harm to others. It forms the basis of negligence claims; if this duty is breached and causes injury, the responsible party may be held liable. 

I have repeatedly said that companies must ensure AI systems are properly trained and monitored to avoid liability for errors caused by biased AI. Although developers may be liable for inherent defects, the business deploying the AI is often responsible for how the system is used. 

If you are going to use AI to detect fair lending, you must be able to identify disparate impact patterns across demographic groups, monitor for "redlining" analogs in digital lending, flag outlier decisions that deviate from modeled norms, and generate audit trails for regulatory review. 

AI is rapidly transforming the mortgage industry, promising increased efficiency, faster decision-making, and improved risk assessment. Still, its integration poses significant challenges related to fair lending compliance, data bias, and transparency. While AI can expand credit access by utilizing alternative data, it risks perpetuating historical biases if models are trained on biased data or utilize "black box" algorithms that make decisions hard to explain.

Monday, September 30, 2024

RESPA Violations: Inconsistent Enforcement

QUESTION 

I am the General Counsel and Compliance Officer of a mortgage lender in the Northeast. We originate retail and wholesale loans and are licensed in all states and territories. Recently, we had a multistate banking audit. The audit found that some of our Third-Party Originators (TPOs) had violated RESPA. 

After conducting a servicing quality control audit, we have decided to sue several TPOs for causing these RESPA violations. The problem we’re having is that RESPA does not address its enforcement consistently or comprehensively. It provides specific penalties in some sections but fails to mention remedies for violations in other sections. 

I want some guidance in navigating RESPA’s maze to determine where a private right of action is available and where it isn’t. In particular, I need some advice on how the TRID rule affected RESPA enforcement and private causes of action. 

COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS 

Servicing Quality Control Audits 

Servicing Tune-up® 

Servicing Compliance 

ANSWER 

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform (Dodd-Frank) and Consumer Protection Act (CPA) may have altered your scenario somewhat. Although courts generally have failed to examine this issue thoroughly, it is important to note that courts have given Chevron deference to the CFPB’s analysis of the topic. However, that approach may be about to change in light of Chevron's demise,[i] which I will discuss a bit below. 

If you’re using outside counsel for this litigation, be sure to retain a firm that has extensive experience in such matters. You can contact me here to discuss a referral. 

I will give you a brief overview with an emphasis on the TILA-RESPA Disclosure Integration Rule (TRID Rule). Let’s first talk history! 

RESPA PENALTIES 

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) contains penalty provisions for Section 6, which deals with mortgage servicing and escrow administration);[ii] Section 8, which prohibits kickbacks and unearned fees);[iii] Section 9, which deals with title companies;[iv] and the escrow statement requirements of Section 10.[v] 

RESPA does not include penalties for violations of other sections, such as Section 4 (HUD-1 Settlement Statements), Section 5 (Special Information Booklets and Good Faith Estimates), Section 10 (Limitations on Escrow Accounts), and Section 12 (Fees for Preparation of Truth-in-Lending or Settlement Statements). However, the absence of RESPA penalty provisions may no longer afford defendants the comfort it once did. 

RESPA’s HANDOFF TO TILA 

The TRID Rule, adopted in November 2013, and effective October 3, 2015, introduced another twist to RESPA enforcement. As just stated, RESPA does not provide private rights of action for violations of Sections 4 and 5, the sections regarding Good Faith Estimates and Settlement Statements. The TRID Rule extrapolated some of the RESPA Section 4 and 5 requirements that had previously appeared in Regulation X (implementing RESPA) over to Regulation Z (implementing TILA, the Truth in Lending Act). 

A HISTORY LESSON 

This transmogrification of RESPA Sections 4 and 5 had the effect of expanding RESPA liability by bringing those provisions into the purview of the TILA – and TILA provides for a private right of action. You might think of it as legal and regulatory prestidigitation! 

Now, there was considerable pushback to this switcheroo. One of the biggest gripes was that the TRID Rule would invite consumers to bring lawsuits seeking TILA remedies for RESPA violations. The upshot of this concern was to have the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) specify which provisions of Regulation Z, as affected by the TRID Rule, relate to TILA requirements and which relate to RESPA requirements.[vi] 

The CFPB awkwardly responded in this way: 

“While the final regulations and official interpretations do not specify which provisions relate to TILA requirements and which relate to RESPA requirements, the section-by-section analysis of the final rule contains a detailed discussion of the statutory authority for each of the integrated disclosure provision.” 

And, having side-stepped a formal resolution, the 

“… detailed discussions of the statutory authority for each of the integrated disclosure provisions [in the section-by-section analysis] provide sufficient guidance for industry, consumers, and the courts regarding the liability issues raised by the commenters.” 

Obviously, this was hardly a satisfying response. Nevertheless, industry participants implemented the TRID Rule while still expressing considerable concern about the CFPB's choice to fit the changes into Regulation Z. The apprehension stemmed from the fact that TILA and Regulation Z impose substantial liability for disclosure violations, compared to the general lack of liability under RESPA and its implementing Regulation X. 

THE CFPB’S SOLOMONIC DECISION 

The CFPB chose to exclude most closed-end consumer credit transactions secured by real property, other than reverse mortgages, from the early disclosure requirements of Regulation Z[vii] and the standard closed-end disclosure requirements of Regulation Z.[viii] In place of those requirements, the CFPB’s TRID Rule created three sets of provisions for the partially-excluded loans: 

1.     Loan Estimate. 

2.     Closing Disclosure. 

3.     Special Information Booklet. 

This partial exclusion of TRID Rule transactions from certain Regulation Z provisions leaves the rest of Regulation Z in effect for those transactions, as previously applied.[ix]

Conversely, the CFPB fit the TRID changes into the RESPA regime by excluding the loans covered by the TRID Rule from five provisions of RESPA Regulation X: 

·       Special Information Booklet. Regulation X § 1024.6. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.19(g) imposes the same Special Information Booklet requirement. 

·       Good Faith Estimate. Regulation X § 1024.7. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.19(e) imposes the Loan Estimate requirement. 

·       HUD-1/1A Settlement Statement. Regulation X § 1024.8. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.19(f) imposes the Closing Disclosure requirement. 

·       HUD-1/1A Administration. Regulation X § 1024.10, one day advance inspection of HUD-1/1A Settlement Statement, delivery, and recordkeeping requirements. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z §§ 1026.19(e) and (f) impose corresponding requirements for Loan Estimates and Closing Disclosures. 

·       Servicing Transfer Application Disclosure. Regulation X § 1024.33(a). For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.37(m)(6) requires a corresponding disclosure on page three of the Loan Estimate. 

In general, the TRID Rule leaves these provisions of Regulation X in place for the loans not subject to TRID, that is, reverse mortgages and the few federally related mortgage loans made by creditors not subject to Regulation Z (i.e., lenders who make five or fewer mortgage loans per calendar year secured by dwellings, unless they make more than one High Cost Mortgage  (HCM)). All of the other provisions of Regulation X remain in place for federally related mortgage loans, including those subject to the TRID Rule. 

GOOD LUCK WITH THAT! 

A careful consideration of the CFPB’s detailed discussion in its section-by-section analysis of the TRID Rule suggests that the agency’s response can be summarized as follows: 

Bona Fortuna in separating disclosure liability between TILA and RESPA! 

Take a deep breath and consider this off-the-cuff outline of the TRID disclosures in the context of the statutory framework for each disclosure item through the lens of the following cascade: 

1.     Any prior implementation of that requirement,

2.     The CFPB’s research into the effectiveness of that disclosure from both a consumer and industry perspective,

3.     The Bureau’s alteration (if applicable) of the statutory requirement or previous regulatory implementation of the requirement to respond to its research,

4.     The Bureau’s agency’s reasons for implementing that disclosure as part of TILA-RESPA disclosure integration, and

5.     The statutory support for including the final version of the disclosure. 

And that’s just for starters! 

In most cases, the ultimate statutory support rested on a specific requirement stated in TILA, RESPA, and/or the Dodd-Frank Act, bolstered by the regulatory flexibility offered in TILA § 105(a) (sometimes also § 105(f)), RESPA § 19(a), and Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1032(a) and 1405(b). 

The CFPB relied on regulatory flexibility given by these provisions because the agency found it necessary to reconcile differences between the RESPA and TILA statutes and between sometimes differing provisions within the TILA statute itself. The agency also found it appropriate to alter many of the statutory requirements (and even discard some) based on conclusions drawn from its research. Consequently, many resulting disclosure items are not derived solely from one statute or the other but from one or more statutory starting points and the broad rulemaking authority given to the CFPB by TILA, RESPA, and the Dodd-Frank Act. Obviously, unraveling the final result to separate a RESPA claim from a TILA claim can be a challenging task. 

So far, most courts have taken the CFPB at its word and relied on its analysis of the TRID Rule (and the 2013 RESPA and TILA Mortgage Servicing Rule) to determine whether a private right of action is available for a regulatory violation. But there has been litigation.[x] And now, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s overruling of the Chevron deference,[xi] I think we’re likely to see courts dive more deeply into this issue.

OBSERVATIONS

As suggested above, the U.S. Supreme Court’s overruling of Chevron deference may require courts to ignore the CFPB’s stated “intentions” and look more closely at the underlying statutory provisions.[xii] 

Conceivably, borrowers might add Dodd-Frank Act claims to their RESPA claims. That is, they might claim that violations of RESPA violate the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 1055 of the Dodd-Frank Act offers the possibility of substantially higher penalties than those specified by RESPA – ranging from $5,000 per day for any violation to $1 million per day for a “knowing violation” (adjusted annually to reflect inflation). Whether an enforcement agency must seek Dodd-Frank penalties or may be obtained by consumers in private actions is an open question courts may someday decide. 

Jonathan Foxx, Ph.D., MBA
Chairman & Managing Director 
Lenders Compliance Group


[i] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024)

[ii] 12 USC §§ 2605(d) and 2614

[iii] 12 USC §§ 2607(d) and 2614

[iv] 12 USC §§ 2608(b) and 2614

[v] 12 USC §§ 2609(d)

[vi] Indeed, a rather convoluted view suggested that the CFPB should implement the TILA disclosure requirements in Regulation Z and the RESPA disclosure requirements in Regulation X in order to discourage litigation invoking TILA’s liability scheme for RESPA violations.

[vii] Regulation Z § 1026.19(a)

[viii] Regulation Z § 1026.18

[ix] For example, the Consumer Handbook on Adjustable Rate Mortgages (CHARM) Booklet and ARM Program Disclosure requirements of Regulation Z § 1026.19(b) continue to apply as they did prior to the TRID Rule.

[x] A recent decision by a federal district court in Texas illustrates this issue. Bassett v. PHH Mortgage, 2024 U.S. Dist. (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2024) (magistrate recommendation), approved and case dismissed by 2024 U.S. Dist. (July 16, 2024). Note: This litigation determined, in particular, that 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(f) and 2614 do not create private causes of action, nor does RESPA provide private causes of action for violations of Regulation X §§ 1024.35 and 1024.39. As support, the court cited several other decisions within its district. The court acknowledged that Regulation X § 1024.41, “unlike the other RESPA provisions at issue…expressly provides for a private right of action.”

[xi] Op. cit. i

[xii] Op. cit. x

Thursday, April 4, 2024

Bankruptcy Still Requires Periodic Statements

QUESTION 

Recently, our internal auditors found that we were not sending our borrowers periodic statements for the billing cycle. As a servicer, we are well aware that this should be done. However, what happened is the borrowers who did not receive the statements were in bankruptcy, so we stopped sending them statements. 

Our position was that there could be no more periodic statements because no more borrower payments were expected, so no more billing was needed. However, the internal auditors said we were wrong to stop billing. 

Frankly, sending periodic statements to a borrower who filed for bankruptcy makes no sense. Maybe you could shed some light on whether the auditors are correct. You may know of a situation or case where periodic statements should still be sent, even if the borrower went into bankruptcy. 

Is a servicer required to provide periodic statements for loans involving bankruptcy? 

COMPLIANCE SOLUTION

Servicing Quality Control Audits

ANSWER 

The answer to your question may surprise you. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires a servicer to provide a periodic statement “for each billing cycle.”[i] A federal district court in California recently considered and rejected a servicer’s argument that it was not required to provide statements for loans it considered “matured.” 

Let's set forth some foundational information before I get to the servicer’s defense. The January 2013 Regulation Z Servicing Rule amended Regulation Z.[ii] In particular, the amendment generally requires mortgage loan servicers (other than small servicers) to provide periodic statements for any closed-end consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling.[iii] The provision deals primarily with content requirements.[iv] 

Now, for that sample “situation or case” you requested. I have in mind the case of Naranjo v. Bank of America.[v] The moral of this story is to continue sending mortgage statements until a loan is paid off or forgiven. That said, TILA offers an exception for bankruptcy cases. But I get ahead of myself. 

In August 2006, the Naranjos obtained a secondary mortgage loan from Golden Empire and secured the loan with a Deed of Trust on their home. Bank of America, Veripro Solutions, and West Coast were successive servicers of the loan. The documents required the loan servicers to provide monthly statements. 

Sometime between 2006 and 2012, the Naranjos defaulted on their loan, and in February 2012, they filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. When the Naranjos received a notice of default and foreclosure a decade later, in January 2023, they filed a temporary restraining order application, which the court converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction. The complaint asserted claims for TILA and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) violations, breach of contract, and other claims. 

However, the Naranjos alleged that they had thought their bankruptcy case had extinguished their debt. 

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion for a preliminary injunction and also granted in part and denied in part the servicers’ motion to dismiss. 

The court found that the Naranjos had properly alleged that their loan servicers had failed to send any statements since at least 2012, violating TILA. They were not required to allege causation to establish the TILA violation, a finding that the 9th Circuit had previously emphasized, stating that 

“even technical or minor violations of the TILA impose liability…to ensure that the consumer is protected.” 

The court further found that, even if there were a causation requirement, the Naranjos plausibly stated a claim because they alleged injury in the form of the threat of foreclosure and the interest that had accrued during the time they believed the loan had been discharged – both injuries the Naranjos plausibly could have avoided had they received timely statements. 

The court noted that the reasonableness of the Naranjos’ belief that their loan had been extinguished was a factual issue not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. 

According to the court, the Naranjos had sufficiently pled that the servicers had violated Regulation Z by failing to send monthly statements. The court rejected the argument that servicer West Coast had no obligation to send statements because the loan had “matured” before it became the servicer; that is, because the loan had “matured,” no billing cycles remained within the meaning of the regulation’s requirement that a loan servicer must provide a statement “for each billing cycle.” 

However, the fact that the loan had “matured” made no difference in the obligation; such an unstated limitation would not serve the purpose of the regulation, which was to provide mortgagors with information about the amount they were expected to pay on their loans. 

The court denied the motion to dismiss a claim that the servicers’ conduct was unfair under California’s Unfair Competition Law. The Naranjos sufficiently alleged that the defendants had neglected their obligations to the Naranjos for a decade, leaving them to believe that the loan had been forgiven, only to be revived once they had built up enough equity in their home for it to be worth being foreclosed upon. 

They also asserted that the activity that led them to believe the loan had been forgiven allowed interest and fees to accumulate that would not otherwise have accumulated. 

Regarding the moral of this story, on October 16, 2013, the CFPB added to Regulation Z an exemption for a servicer concerning periodic statement requirements while the consumer is a debtor in bankruptcy.[vi] 

The CFPB modified this exemption, effective April 19, 2018. The CFPB had received comments seeking more detail on statements in the original Servicing Rule’s preamble regarding bankruptcy. The preamble had acknowledged that the Bankruptcy Code might prevent attempts to collect a debt from a consumer in bankruptcy, but stated that the Bureau did not believe the Bankruptcy Code would prevent a servicer from sending a consumer a statement on the status of the mortgage loan. The CFPB had also specified that the final rule allows servicers to make changes to the periodic statement they believe are necessary when a consumer is in bankruptcy. For example, a servicer could include a message about the bankruptcy and alternatively present the amount due to reflect payment obligations determined by the individual bankruptcy proceeding.[vii] 

The exemption was part of an interim rule exempting servicers from the TILA requirements[viii] while the consumer was a debtor in bankruptcy. To exempt a mortgage loan from the normal periodic statement requirements where any consumer on the loan is a debtor in bankruptcy[ix] or has discharged liability for the mortgage loan[x], the following must take place: 

(1) the consumer requests in writing that the servicer cease providing a periodic statement or coupon book; 

(2) the consumer’s bankruptcy plan provides that the consumer will surrender the dwelling securing the mortgage loan, provides for the avoidance of the lien securing the mortgage loan, or otherwise does not provide for, as applicable, the payment of pre-bankruptcy arrearage or the maintenance of payments due; 

(3) a court enters an order in the bankruptcy case providing for the avoidance of the lien securing the mortgage loan, lifting the automatic stay with regard to the dwelling securing the loan, or requiring the servicer to cease providing a periodic statement or coupon book; or 

(4) the consumer files a statement of intention to surrender the dwelling securing the mortgage loan with the court overseeing the bankruptcy case, and the consumer has not made any partial or periodic payment on the mortgage loan after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. 

This exemption ceases if the consumer affirms personal liability for the loan or any consumer on the loan requests in writing that the servicer provide a periodic statement (or coupon book) unless a court enters an order in the bankruptcy case requiring the servicer to cease providing a periodic statement (or coupon book).[xi] 

Instead of the normal periodic statement, while any consumer on a mortgage loan is a debtor in bankruptcy or if the consumer has discharged personal liability for the mortgage loan[xii], a servicer must provide a modified periodic statement. The modified periodic statement may omit the normally required information regarding late fees, length of delinquency, risks of delinquency, and delinquent account history, and it need not show the amount due more prominently than other disclosures. A servicer then transitions to providing the normal periodic statement when the loan ceases to be subject to discharge, the debtor exits bankruptcy, or the bankruptcy exemption no longer applies.

Jonathan Foxx, Ph.D., MBA
Chairman & Managing Director 
Lenders Compliance Group


[i] § 1026.41

[ii] Including § 1026.41, which implements TILA § 128(f), added by § 1420 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.

[iii] Ibid

[iv] Appendix H-30 offers sample forms, which are properly used to provide a safe harbor for compliance.

[v] Naranjo v. Bank of America, 2023 U.S. Dist. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2023)

[vi] § 1026.41(e)(5)

[vii] Commenters sought clarification on reconciling the periodic statement requirements with various bankruptcy law requirements. They expressed concerns that bankruptcy courts, under certain circumstances, might find a servicer in violation of bankruptcy’s automatic stay or discharge injunction if the servicer provided a periodic statement, whether or not it included a disclaimer. Also, servicers had expressed concern about fulfilling the Regulation Z requirements in a way that did not confuse consumers regarding their status in bankruptcy, and that servicers were not attempting to collect on accounts. Others had asked questions about possible consumer confusion depending on what “amount due” and “payment due date” servicers would disclose in a Chapter 13 case that has different pre-petition arrearage cure payments and post-petition monthly payments, which might be due on different dates.

[viii] Op. cit. i

[ix] Under Title 11 of the U.S. Code

[x] Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 717, 1141, 1228, or 1328

[xi] A servicer may establish an exclusive address that a consumer must use to submit a written request under this provision.

[xii] Op. cit. x

Thursday, March 7, 2024

Executor’s Access to Digital Account

QUESTION 

I am the General Counsel of a large Western mortgage lender. I am writing on behalf of myself and our Chief Compliance Officer. We have received notice from an executor of a borrower’s estate. The executor wants access to our digital portal. The executor’s purpose is to review the decedent’s account, assets, and liabilities. 

A careful reading of estate-related documents and reviewing the power of attorney show that the borrower did not grant the executor specific authority to access a digital portal. We do not want costly litigation. It is our view that we cannot give the executor access to the digital assets of the deceased borrower’s account. 

We could use some guidance on applicable regulatory requirements in two ways: 

  • Broadly, what is the regulatory landscape for an executor being denied access to loan records after a borrower’s death? 
  • In particular, is there any regulatory requirement or case law that applies to denying an executor’s access to a digital portal if such access is not specifically granted in a will or power of attorney? 

COMPLIANCE SOLUTION

Policies and Procedures

ANSWER 

Your questions touch on several regulatory and legal issues, including “successor in interest” as well as the nexus between estate law and regulatory requirements. 

In October 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) amended Regulation Z, effective April 19, 2018, to apply to “successor in interest” all of the January 2013 Mortgage Servicing Rule provisions, including the payment processing requirements, once a servicer has a "confirmed successor in interest." 

The Truth-in-Lending Act’s Regulation Z defines “successor in interest” to mean 

… a person to whom an ownership interest in a dwelling securing a closed-end consumer credit transaction is transferred from a consumer, provided that the transfer is: 

(1) a transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety; 

(2) a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of the consumer; 

(3) a transfer where the spouse or children of the consumer become an owner of the property; 

(4) a transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, legal separation agreement, or from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which the spouse of the consumer becomes an owner of the property; or 

(5) a transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the consumer is and remains a beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property.[i] 

Regulation Z[ii] defines “confirmed successor in interest” as a “successor in interest” once a servicer has confirmed the "successor in interest" identity and ownership interest in the dwelling. 

Regulation Z and Regulation X (the regulation implementing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, RESPA), both affected by the 2013 Mortgage Servicing Rule provisions, work together to address the criteria for the "confirmed successor in interest." 

Regulation X offers guidance on how to confirm a "successor in interest." In general, a mortgage loan servicer must respond to a written request indicating that the person making the request may be a "successor in interest" by providing a written description of the documents the servicer reasonably requires to confirm the person’s identity and ownership interest. 

Further, Regulation X requires mortgage loan servicers to maintain policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the servicer can, upon receiving notice of the death of a borrower or any transfer of the property securing a loan, promptly facilitate communication with any potential or "confirmed successor(s) in interest."[iii] 

The definitions of “successor in interest” and “confirmed successor in interest” are important because Regulation Z defines the term “consumer” (viz., RESPA similarly defines the term “borrower”) to include a "confirmed successor in interest" for purposes of various (but not all) of its provisions, including its requirements regarding escrow account closing notices, ARM adjustment notices, crediting of payments, late charge pyramiding, payoff statements, mortgage transfer disclosures, and periodic statements. 

In general, a loan servicer is not required to provide notices to a "confirmed successor in interest" if it is already providing the same disclosure to another consumer on the account. For example, a loan servicer is not required to provide a periodic statement for a mortgage loan to a "confirmed successor in interest" if the servicer provides the same periodic statement to another consumer. 

What you should note here is that both the Regulation X and Regulation Z definitions of “successor in interest” are limited to transferees who receive ownership in property that secures closed-end credit, because Regulation X[iv] defines “mortgage loan” for purposes of its servicing provisions to exclude open-end lines of credit, while the Regulation Z[v] definition refers to closed-end consumer credit transactions. 

To be clear, transferees of properties that secure open-end credit are entitled to protections as borrowers under Regulation X and consumers under Regulation Z if they assume the loan obligation under state law or are otherwise liable for the mortgage loan obligation.[vi] 

Regulation X offers an option for servicers to provide an initial explanatory notice and acknowledgment form to “confirmed successor(s) in interest” who have not assumed the mortgage loan obligation and are not otherwise liable for it. The notice must explain that the servicer has confirmed the "successor in interest" identity and ownership interest and that the “confirmed successor in interest” is not liable unless and until the “confirmed successor in interest” assumes the mortgage loan obligation under state law. 

The notice must also explain that the “successor in interest” may be entitled to receive certain notices and communications about the mortgage loan if the servicer is not providing them to another “successor in interest” or consumer on the account. The notice must indicate that the "confirmed successor in interest" has to return the acknowledgment to receive servicing notices under the Mortgage Servicing Rule ("Rule").

Regulation X[vii] and Regulation Z[viii] relieve servicers that send this optional notice and an acknowledgment form from certain obligations set forth in the Rule, including notice requirements and the requirement to engage in live contacts with the "confirmed successor in interest." 

In effect, the Rule suspends these obligations until the “confirmed successor in interest” provides the servicer an executed acknowledgment indicating a desire to receive the notices or assumes the mortgage loan obligation under state law. 

Your question about an executor’s access to a deceased borrower's digital account seems similar to a case considered by a federal district court in Maryland. The case, Holland v. Signal Financial Credit Union, involved a TILA periodic statement claim filed by the executor of a borrower’s estate.[ix] 

Here’s a brief outline of the case. Evelyn Holland was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in March 2013, after which she asked William Holland, her first cousin, “to accept her power of attorney to manage her financial affairs, and to act as eventual estate Executor.” He agreed. Evelyn died in July 2022. William was the sole heir of the decedent's estate. He alleged that Signal Financial Credit Union had blocked his digital access to Evelyn’s accounts, including her home equity line of credit (HELOC). 

William sued. He alleged that the credit union’s refusal to grant him digital access violated the Maryland Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act and TILA. The court granted summary judgment to the credit union. 

According to the court, the credit union did not violate the Maryland statute because William testified that he was not granted authority to access digital assets either in Evelyn’s power of attorney or will nor did he ever make a written request for access as required by the statute. 

Regulation Z and TILA only required periodic statements to the “consumer,” defined as the person to whom the loan was made or any “confirmed successor in interest.” The TILA claim failed because Evelyn was the only consumer on the HELOC, and no “confirmed successor in interest” had been designated. 

It is undisputed that William never requested digital access to Evelyn's HELOC accounts. And even if he had requested such access, the court found that TILA and its implementing Regulation Z do not require that digital access be granted to anyone other than the person who took out the loan. 

William failed to allege actual damages from the purported TILA violations, which left him without standing.[x]

Jonathan Foxx, Ph.D., MBA
Chairman & Managing Director 
Lenders Compliance Group


[i] § 1026.2(a)(27)(i)

[ii] § 1026.2(a)(27)(ii)

[iii] The provision makes clear that servicers do not need to search for a potential "successor in interest" if the servicer has not received actual notice of their existence.

[iv] § 1024.31

[v] Op. cit. 1

[vi] For example, see Regulation Z § 1026.20(f) and Regulation Z Comments 2(a)(11)-4.

[vii] § 1024.32(c)

[viii] §§ 1026.20(f), 1026.39(f), and 1026.41(g)

[ix] Holland v. Signal Financial Credit Union, D. Md. Jan. 16, 2024

[x] The court did not point out that Regulation Z’s “confirmed successor in interest” provisions do not apply to open-end credit (i.e., HELOCs) unless the “successor in interest” assumes the loan obligation.

Thursday, January 4, 2024

Consumer Purpose Loans

QUESTION 

I am a loan officer and work for a mortgage broker. I can’t figure out if a loan I’m doing is for a person or a business. My boss says that the regulations determine what is considered a consumer loan or a business loan. My borrower wants to put a mortgage on a residential property. 

But my boss can’t tell me which regulations to look at; frankly, even if I did, I’m not a lawyer and would probably not get it straight. But he says I have to figure it out for myself if I am doing a consumer loan. I tried a search engine, and that only confused me. At this point, I can tell there are consumer loans and business loans. 

I don’t want to look dumb to my customer, but I feel pretty stupid that I don’t really know the difference between business and consumer loans – probably because I have never had this issue before! I need to know what kind of application I’m doing. I hope you can help. 

Maybe this is a dumb question, but what is a consumer? 

Is there a sliding scale or some way to figure out if this is a consumer loan? 

ANSWER 

Thank you for your question. Your question is valuable! I think you’d be surprised how many people in the mortgage community do not know the answer to this question. In my long life, I have found that questions are not dumb, only the answers. 

Let’s briefly tour the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) to understand how the term “consumer” has been fashioned. There is a lot of statutory and case history here, but I will try to boil it down to the basics. 

TILA defines the “consumer” credit transaction as 

“… one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 

Note the word “purposes.” This means that the purpose of the loan is an essential part of the definition. The consumer credit transaction is a consumer-purpose transaction concerning its primary use. 

Regulation Z, which implements TILA, defines “consumer” as a 

“… cardholder or a natural person to whom consumer credit is offered or extended.” 

This definition references Regulation Z’s definition of “consumer credit,” which means 

“…credit offered or extended to a consumer primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 

For rescission,[i] the term “consumer” also includes a natural person whose security interest is or will be retained or acquired if their ownership interest in the dwelling is or will be subject to the security interest. 

The regulation includes one exception to the rule that a consumer must be either a natural person (or a cardholder). Credit extended to trusts is considered consumer credit extended to a natural person if the trust has been established for tax or estate planning purposes or as a land trust. 

The term “consumer” also includes a “confirmed successor in interest” with respect to Regulation Z’s provisions regarding escrow account closing notices, adjustable-rate mortgage adjustment notices, crediting of payments, late charge pyramiding, payoff statements, mortgage transfer disclosures, and periodic statements. 

So, Regulation Z includes a general definition of “consumer” for most sections of the regulation and a special definition that applies to the right of rescission. (The general rule includes only natural persons or cardholders to whom consumer credit is offered or extended.) This means that persons such as endorsers, guarantors, or sureties generally are not “consumers” for purposes of the general rule. 

The special rule for rescission, however, broadens the definition to include any natural person, including a guarantor, surety, or person who is not even liable on the credit transaction, when that person’s home is subject to the security interest. That person has the right to receive the “material disclosures” required by Regulation Z, including the notices of the right to cancel, and, subject to Regulation Z’s specific requirements, may rescind the transaction. 

As you might expect, determining whether or not a person is a “consumer” can become more complicated than the foregoing black letter law might suggest, as often is the case with regulatory definitions. 

The phrase “personal, family, or household purposes” illustrates the possible difficulties. This phrase arises in both the statutory and Regulation Z definitions of “consumer” and “consumer credit” as well as in TILA’s exemption of “credit transactions involving extensions of credit primarily for business, commercial, or agricultural purposes.”[ii] 

Regulation Z specifically acknowledges this complication thus: 

Primary purpose. There is no precise test for what constitutes credit offered or extended for personal, family, or household purposes, nor for what constitutes the primary purpose.”[iii] (My emphasis.) 

In effect, Regulation Z admits a case-by-case evaluation is needed to determine if a loan is consumer-purpose.[iv] Or, as your colleague told you, “figure it out” for yourself! 

But there are guidelines and standards, and I will provide a few to consider.

Disclosures 

When in doubt, proceed cautiously. Here’s one maxim! 

For practical purposes, Regulation Z makes clear that if a creditor is uncertain whether its requirements apply, the creditor may choose to make TILA disclosures without waiving the business purpose exemption: 

“Primary purposes. A creditor must determine in each case if the transaction is primarily for an exempt purpose. If some question exists as to the primary purpose for a credit extension, the creditor is, of course, free to make the disclosures, and the fact that disclosures are made under such circumstances is not controlling on the question of whether the transaction was exempt.”[v] 

Sliding Scale Guidelines 

You asked if there’s “a sliding scale or some way to figure out” if you’re originating a consumer loan. Regulation Z offers general factors[vi] to consider in determining whether a transaction is primarily for a consumer or business purpose, as follows: 

(1) the relationship of the borrower’s primary occupation to the acquisition: the more closely related, the more likely it is to be business purpose; 

(2) the degree to which the borrower will personally manage the acquisition: the more personal involvement there is, the more likely it is to be business purpose; 

(3) the ratio of income from the acquisition to the total income of the borrower: the higher the ratio, the more likely it is to be business purpose; 

(4) the size of the transaction: the larger the transaction, the more likely it is to be business purpose; and 

(5) the borrower’s statement of purpose for the loan. 

Examples of business credit transactions would be a loan to expand a business, even if secured by the borrower’s residence or personal property; a loan to improve a principal residence by putting in a business office; or a business account occasionally used for consumer purposes.

Jonathan Foxx, Ph.D., MBA
Chairman & Managing Director
Lenders Compliance Group


[i] Regulation Z §§ 1026.15 and 1026.23

[ii] 15 USC § 1603(1)

[iii] Comment 2(a)(12)-1

[iv] Comment to § 1026.3(a)

[v] Comment 3(a)-1

[vi] Comment 3(a)-3