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Showing posts with label Mortgage Servicing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mortgage Servicing. Show all posts

Thursday, October 16, 2025

Transition: Subservicing to In-House Servicing

QUESTION 

We have used a subservicer for many years. Recently, we decided to bring servicing in-house. The committee we formed to shepherd the transition has determined that several guidelines must be developed to ensure a smooth transition. 

One problem we discovered is that some processes and procedures were not documented and approved. Relevant policies need some updating. The change management area needs further fulfillment. But we are overcoming these issues well as we get ready for the transition. 

Handling a smooth transition from subservicing to in-house servicing requires considerable attention to process, procedures, policies, and risk evaluations. I would like to know a few pointers I can take to the committee to assist in our plans. 

What tips can you give us to ensure a smooth transition from subservicing to in-house servicing? 

SOLUTION 

Servicing Platform Development 

Monthly Servicing Compliance

ANSWER 

Transitioning from a subservicer to a servicer is a complex process that involves gaining approval from investors and significantly expanding operational capacity. A subservicer performs the day-to-day duties of servicing a loan, but the master servicer holds the ultimate contractual responsibility to the investor. The transition to a servicer requires a company to develop the robust infrastructure and oversight capabilities of servicing, which go far beyond the monitoring of typical subservicer functions. 

To transition from a subservicer to a servicer conducting the servicing of its own loan portfolio, a financial institution must assume greater responsibilities and risks, which requires building significant internal capacity and obtaining approval from investors. The transition involves expanding operations, upgrading technology, and shifting legal obligations. 

As a master servicer, you own the right to perform servicing and may choose to service loans yourself or through subservicers. In the agency mortgage market, master servicers typically outsource the day-to-day functions to subservicers and assume a high-level oversight role. You do not state whether your in-house servicing will be exclusively for your own portfolio or if you plan to service both your own portfolio and also offer subservicing. For purposes of this article, I will assume the latter is the case. 

Key challenges when transitioning to servicing include meeting certain capital requirements, managing complex data migration, navigating intense regulatory scrutiny, and controlling operational costs while scaling the business. 

In the development of servicing platforms, we have outlined a step-by-step approach, consisting of five essential transition categories. Every one of these categories is essential to the smooth transition to in-house servicing. If your committee does not take these categories into account, the success of your transition may be in peril. 

The following are essential factors in the development of an in-house servicing platform. 

five Essential Transition Categories 

1. Investor approval 

Obtain approval from appropriate investors to function as a master servicer that services its own portfolio. 

Application Submission 

The process requires a detailed business background, financial health, policies, and operational procedures. 

Onsite Review 

An investor's risk team may conduct an on-site operational review to evaluate the company's servicing capabilities. 

Financial and Operational Assessment 

Investors may review the company's financial and operational metrics to ensure it has the capacity to handle the full range of servicing responsibilities. 

Compliance with Guidelines 

The company must meet all applicable eligibility requirements set forth in the investor's servicing and selling guides, announcements, formal issuances, and Best Practice expectations.

Thursday, September 11, 2025

Stablecoin Mortgage Payments

QUESTION 

I have been reading your articles about cryptocurrency and mortgage banking. Thank you for providing these articles. I have shared your website with many people, and I get the hard copy of your articles, which I use in our management meetings. 

I am a member of senior management and on the Board. We are a large lender and servicer in the northeast, with offices in almost all states. Recently, our servicing CFO asked the Board to consider accepting stablecoins for mortgage payments. Our attorneys gave us a demonstration of the various legal complexities. But I want a high-level outline, such as only you can do! 

You should know that most of the Board was not convinced that now is the time to adopt stablecoins (or any crypto) for mortgage payments. We have also been researching crypto-backed mortgages, which seems like a path some of us want to follow. I'm interested in your thoughts on allowing borrowers to make mortgage payments in stablecoin. Maybe, also, you could tell us what you think about crypto-backed mortgages. 

Should lenders accept stablecoin for mortgage payments? 

Are crypto-backed mortgages a better option? 

COMPLIANCE SOLUTION 

CMS Tune-up 

RESPONSE 

The idea of lenders accepting stablecoin for mortgage payments is emerging. Still, it is not a widespread practice and carries significant risks that have prevented adoption by most traditional financial institutions. Some Fintech companies, however, are exploring crypto-backed mortgages, which typically use stablecoins as collateral rather than for monthly payments. For traditional lenders, the risks involved generally outweigh the benefits. 

Please get in touch with me to discuss your plans. Legal risk is only one of several risk variables. We can help you develop rollout implementation strategies. The issues involved cover a wide range of variables, such as legal, regulatory, interest rate, liquidity, operational, market, compliance, reputational, strategic, and prepayment risks. Please view my response as a conversation starter. 

Here are some recent articles I have published on cryptocurrency vis-à-vis mortgage banking. 

·       GENIUS Act: Fool's Gold, 

·       GENIUS Act: Mortgage Banking Ambush, 

·       Cryptocurrency: Risks to Mortgage Banking, 

·       Cryptocurrency Dilemma, and 

·       Challenges of Cryptocurrency Compliance.  

Two types of lenders 

There are two types of lenders in crypto-related mortgage banking. These are: 

Traditional Lenders: Traditional financial institutions are highly regulated and cautious with cryptocurrencies. They typically require that any crypto used for mortgage transactions—including stablecoins—be liquidated into U.S. dollars and held in a verifiable bank account for a period of 30 to 120 days. 

Fintech Crypto Lenders: A niche market of Fintech firms that specialize in crypto-backed mortgages. These lenders offer loans secured by cryptocurrency collateral, often including major stablecoins. Borrowers pledge their crypto assets, and the lender issues the loan in fiat currency. 

Whether a lender should accept stablecoin payments depends on their risk tolerance, regulatory environment, and technological capabilities. 

·       For traditional banks, the regulatory and operational hurdles are high, and the risks often outweigh the potential benefits. Federal mortgage regulations and investor demands for stable, traditional assets reinforce their current cautious approach. 

·       For a niche Fintech lender, the calculation is different. By specializing in crypto-backed loans, they build the necessary infrastructure and accept the higher risks for a target demographic. 

For most borrowers, the most practical approach today is to convert stablecoins into cash well before applying for a mortgage through a traditional lender. As the regulatory landscape and market maturity evolve, perhaps the widespread acceptance of stablecoin mortgage payments may become more common.

Monday, July 21, 2025

Servicing Quality Control: Subservicer Scrutiny

QUESTION 

We are a lender that subservices our loans through a reputable servicer. We originate Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, USDA, FHA, VA, HECM, and Non-QM loan products. Our internal audit identified that we should have monitoring and control procedures in place for our subservicer. 

We already have a Loan Servicing Quality Control Plan. However, we do not have a separate policy for monitoring and controlling the subservicer function. Our internal auditor recommends that we establish such a policy immediately. 

As the General Counsel and Compliance Officer, I am responsible for ensuring that we meet all regulatory and legal requirements in our loan originating and servicing activities. I would like your view on whether we should have a separate policy for monitoring the subservicer. 

SOLUTIONS 

Subservicing Quality Control Audits

Loan Servicing Quality Control Plan

Monitoring & Control of Subservicer Policy 

RESPONSE 

Based on your question, you appear to be a master servicer. A master servicer is responsible for overseeing and auditing the activities of its subservicer. This responsibility arises from the fact that the master servicer remains liable for the performance of all servicing obligations, even when they are delegated to a subservicer. 

A master servicer is an entity responsible for overseeing the administration and management of a pool of loans, often in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other structured finance products. It ensures proper loan management and that investors receive their returns on time. 

Master Servicer 

In particular, a master servicer's role includes the following: 

Their role and responsibilities include: 

·       Loan administration and management 

Handling day-to-day operations like payment collection, managing escrow accounts, and distributing payments to investors. 

·       Oversight of other servicers 

Appointing and coordinating with sub-servicers while remaining liable to bondholders for their performance. 

·       Ensuring compliance

Ensuring that servicing practices comply with regulatory and contractual requirements. 

·       Monitoring and reporting 

Tracking portfolio performance and reporting to the trustee and investors. 

·       Handling borrower communication and requests 

Serving as a point of contact for borrowers. 

·       Coordination with special servicers 

Working with special servicers for distressed or defaulted loans. 

You should have a separate policy for monitoring and control of the subservicer. Usually, the policy complements the Loan Servicing Quality Control Plan that you mentioned. Both the CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) and GSEs (Government-Sponsored Enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) mandate that lenders (master servicers) proactively oversee and regularly audit their subservicer relationships and operations.[i] 

The master servicer is responsible for ensuring that the subservicer complies with all applicable regulations and contractual obligations, as required by Fannie Mae and other investors. Failing to oversee or audit a subservicer exposes the master servicer to significant business risks, including potential lawsuits, fines, and reputational damage if the subservicer fails to meet compliance guidelines or operational standards. 

Second Line of Defense 

The audit of a subservicer's servicing files falls under the Second Line of Defense for the originating institution that outsourced the servicing, with the possibility that the Third Line of Defense (viz., internal audits) may also perform independent audits to ensure effectiveness. 

As the Second Line of Defense, the originating institution has the ultimate responsibility for the subservicer's actions; therefore, it must oversee the subservicer's compliance with regulations and its own servicing standards. The act of reviewing the subservicer's servicing files and operations to ensure adherence to contractual obligations and regulatory requirements is considered a core function of the Second Line of Defense, which involves monitoring and oversight functions, such as risk management and compliance departments. 

Thus, the Second Line of Defense provides expertise, support, and monitoring regarding risk-related matters. I would break those features into the following activities: 

·       Developing and implementing policies and procedures for subservicer oversight. 

·       Conducting regular reviews of the subservicer's performance and compliance. 

·       Assessing the subservicer's internal controls and risk management framework. 

·       Monitoring the subservicer for compliance with regulatory requirements (CFPB, OCC, GSEs). 

·       Developing and implementing corrective actions to address any identified issues. 

Essentially, the Second Line of Defense is actively involved in ensuring the subservicer is compliant and performing as expected, while the Third Line of Defense audits the effectiveness of that oversight and the subservicer's operations to ensure the entire risk management framework is sound. I think your internal auditor was correct in recommending a separate policy for monitoring and controlling the subservicer. Use it in conjunction with your overall Loan Servicing Quality Control Plan. 

Oversight and Auditing 

There are five components of subservicer oversight and auditing. A robust subservicer oversight program should include regular audits of servicing files and operations. Implementing the program is not merely a recommended Best Practice but a crucial aspect of a master servicer's responsibility to manage risk and ensure compliance within the mortgage industry.

1. Establishing an Oversight and Surveillance Program 

The program should monitor the subservicer's compliance with servicing requirements outlined in the master servicer's contracts and applicable guidelines. 

These three elements must be included in oversight: 

·       Periodic audits and quality control (QC) reviews: These reviews help verify that the subservicer is adhering to contractual obligations and regulatory requirements. 

·       Operational audits: These audits delve deeper and can assess areas such as customer service reviews, escrow administration, collections, and loss mitigation procedures. 

·       Evaluation of training programs, financial strength, and overall experience: These evaluations help ensure that the subservicer has the resources and expertise to perform its duties effectively. 

2. Maintaining Policies and Procedures 

Master servicers must have established procedures for selecting and assessing subservicers, encompassing their experience, training programs, financial stability, quality control, and capacity to handle the portfolio. 

3. Operational Audits 

These audits should encompass customer service reviews, escrow administration oversight, procedural assessments of collection and loss mitigation, and examinations of bankruptcy, foreclosure, and REO management, among other areas. 

4. Ongoing Monitoring and Review 

This type of monitor involves continuously evaluating subservicer performance data, including loan-level data, customer satisfaction scores, response times, and error rates. 

5. On-Site Audits and Reviews

Regularly conducting on-site audits and reviews ensures compliance with contractual requirements and regulatory standards. 


Jonathan Foxx, PhD, MBA
Chairman & Managing Director
Lenders Compliance Group
 


[i] Both the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require master servicers to maintain oversight of their subservicers. Fannie Mae, for example, requires the master servicer to ensure that the subservicer is complying with all Fannie Mae requirements.

Monday, September 30, 2024

RESPA Violations: Inconsistent Enforcement

QUESTION 

I am the General Counsel and Compliance Officer of a mortgage lender in the Northeast. We originate retail and wholesale loans and are licensed in all states and territories. Recently, we had a multistate banking audit. The audit found that some of our Third-Party Originators (TPOs) had violated RESPA. 

After conducting a servicing quality control audit, we have decided to sue several TPOs for causing these RESPA violations. The problem we’re having is that RESPA does not address its enforcement consistently or comprehensively. It provides specific penalties in some sections but fails to mention remedies for violations in other sections. 

I want some guidance in navigating RESPA’s maze to determine where a private right of action is available and where it isn’t. In particular, I need some advice on how the TRID rule affected RESPA enforcement and private causes of action. 

COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS 

Servicing Quality Control Audits 

Servicing Tune-up® 

Servicing Compliance 

ANSWER 

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform (Dodd-Frank) and Consumer Protection Act (CPA) may have altered your scenario somewhat. Although courts generally have failed to examine this issue thoroughly, it is important to note that courts have given Chevron deference to the CFPB’s analysis of the topic. However, that approach may be about to change in light of Chevron's demise,[i] which I will discuss a bit below. 

If you’re using outside counsel for this litigation, be sure to retain a firm that has extensive experience in such matters. You can contact me here to discuss a referral. 

I will give you a brief overview with an emphasis on the TILA-RESPA Disclosure Integration Rule (TRID Rule). Let’s first talk history! 

RESPA PENALTIES 

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) contains penalty provisions for Section 6, which deals with mortgage servicing and escrow administration);[ii] Section 8, which prohibits kickbacks and unearned fees);[iii] Section 9, which deals with title companies;[iv] and the escrow statement requirements of Section 10.[v] 

RESPA does not include penalties for violations of other sections, such as Section 4 (HUD-1 Settlement Statements), Section 5 (Special Information Booklets and Good Faith Estimates), Section 10 (Limitations on Escrow Accounts), and Section 12 (Fees for Preparation of Truth-in-Lending or Settlement Statements). However, the absence of RESPA penalty provisions may no longer afford defendants the comfort it once did. 

RESPA’s HANDOFF TO TILA 

The TRID Rule, adopted in November 2013, and effective October 3, 2015, introduced another twist to RESPA enforcement. As just stated, RESPA does not provide private rights of action for violations of Sections 4 and 5, the sections regarding Good Faith Estimates and Settlement Statements. The TRID Rule extrapolated some of the RESPA Section 4 and 5 requirements that had previously appeared in Regulation X (implementing RESPA) over to Regulation Z (implementing TILA, the Truth in Lending Act). 

A HISTORY LESSON 

This transmogrification of RESPA Sections 4 and 5 had the effect of expanding RESPA liability by bringing those provisions into the purview of the TILA – and TILA provides for a private right of action. You might think of it as legal and regulatory prestidigitation! 

Now, there was considerable pushback to this switcheroo. One of the biggest gripes was that the TRID Rule would invite consumers to bring lawsuits seeking TILA remedies for RESPA violations. The upshot of this concern was to have the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) specify which provisions of Regulation Z, as affected by the TRID Rule, relate to TILA requirements and which relate to RESPA requirements.[vi] 

The CFPB awkwardly responded in this way: 

“While the final regulations and official interpretations do not specify which provisions relate to TILA requirements and which relate to RESPA requirements, the section-by-section analysis of the final rule contains a detailed discussion of the statutory authority for each of the integrated disclosure provision.” 

And, having side-stepped a formal resolution, the 

“… detailed discussions of the statutory authority for each of the integrated disclosure provisions [in the section-by-section analysis] provide sufficient guidance for industry, consumers, and the courts regarding the liability issues raised by the commenters.” 

Obviously, this was hardly a satisfying response. Nevertheless, industry participants implemented the TRID Rule while still expressing considerable concern about the CFPB's choice to fit the changes into Regulation Z. The apprehension stemmed from the fact that TILA and Regulation Z impose substantial liability for disclosure violations, compared to the general lack of liability under RESPA and its implementing Regulation X. 

THE CFPB’S SOLOMONIC DECISION 

The CFPB chose to exclude most closed-end consumer credit transactions secured by real property, other than reverse mortgages, from the early disclosure requirements of Regulation Z[vii] and the standard closed-end disclosure requirements of Regulation Z.[viii] In place of those requirements, the CFPB’s TRID Rule created three sets of provisions for the partially-excluded loans: 

1.     Loan Estimate. 

2.     Closing Disclosure. 

3.     Special Information Booklet. 

This partial exclusion of TRID Rule transactions from certain Regulation Z provisions leaves the rest of Regulation Z in effect for those transactions, as previously applied.[ix]

Conversely, the CFPB fit the TRID changes into the RESPA regime by excluding the loans covered by the TRID Rule from five provisions of RESPA Regulation X: 

·       Special Information Booklet. Regulation X § 1024.6. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.19(g) imposes the same Special Information Booklet requirement. 

·       Good Faith Estimate. Regulation X § 1024.7. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.19(e) imposes the Loan Estimate requirement. 

·       HUD-1/1A Settlement Statement. Regulation X § 1024.8. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.19(f) imposes the Closing Disclosure requirement. 

·       HUD-1/1A Administration. Regulation X § 1024.10, one day advance inspection of HUD-1/1A Settlement Statement, delivery, and recordkeeping requirements. For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z §§ 1026.19(e) and (f) impose corresponding requirements for Loan Estimates and Closing Disclosures. 

·       Servicing Transfer Application Disclosure. Regulation X § 1024.33(a). For loans subject to the TRID Rule, Regulation Z § 1026.37(m)(6) requires a corresponding disclosure on page three of the Loan Estimate. 

In general, the TRID Rule leaves these provisions of Regulation X in place for the loans not subject to TRID, that is, reverse mortgages and the few federally related mortgage loans made by creditors not subject to Regulation Z (i.e., lenders who make five or fewer mortgage loans per calendar year secured by dwellings, unless they make more than one High Cost Mortgage  (HCM)). All of the other provisions of Regulation X remain in place for federally related mortgage loans, including those subject to the TRID Rule. 

GOOD LUCK WITH THAT! 

A careful consideration of the CFPB’s detailed discussion in its section-by-section analysis of the TRID Rule suggests that the agency’s response can be summarized as follows: 

Bona Fortuna in separating disclosure liability between TILA and RESPA! 

Take a deep breath and consider this off-the-cuff outline of the TRID disclosures in the context of the statutory framework for each disclosure item through the lens of the following cascade: 

1.     Any prior implementation of that requirement,

2.     The CFPB’s research into the effectiveness of that disclosure from both a consumer and industry perspective,

3.     The Bureau’s alteration (if applicable) of the statutory requirement or previous regulatory implementation of the requirement to respond to its research,

4.     The Bureau’s agency’s reasons for implementing that disclosure as part of TILA-RESPA disclosure integration, and

5.     The statutory support for including the final version of the disclosure. 

And that’s just for starters! 

In most cases, the ultimate statutory support rested on a specific requirement stated in TILA, RESPA, and/or the Dodd-Frank Act, bolstered by the regulatory flexibility offered in TILA § 105(a) (sometimes also § 105(f)), RESPA § 19(a), and Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1032(a) and 1405(b). 

The CFPB relied on regulatory flexibility given by these provisions because the agency found it necessary to reconcile differences between the RESPA and TILA statutes and between sometimes differing provisions within the TILA statute itself. The agency also found it appropriate to alter many of the statutory requirements (and even discard some) based on conclusions drawn from its research. Consequently, many resulting disclosure items are not derived solely from one statute or the other but from one or more statutory starting points and the broad rulemaking authority given to the CFPB by TILA, RESPA, and the Dodd-Frank Act. Obviously, unraveling the final result to separate a RESPA claim from a TILA claim can be a challenging task. 

So far, most courts have taken the CFPB at its word and relied on its analysis of the TRID Rule (and the 2013 RESPA and TILA Mortgage Servicing Rule) to determine whether a private right of action is available for a regulatory violation. But there has been litigation.[x] And now, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s overruling of the Chevron deference,[xi] I think we’re likely to see courts dive more deeply into this issue.

OBSERVATIONS

As suggested above, the U.S. Supreme Court’s overruling of Chevron deference may require courts to ignore the CFPB’s stated “intentions” and look more closely at the underlying statutory provisions.[xii] 

Conceivably, borrowers might add Dodd-Frank Act claims to their RESPA claims. That is, they might claim that violations of RESPA violate the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 1055 of the Dodd-Frank Act offers the possibility of substantially higher penalties than those specified by RESPA – ranging from $5,000 per day for any violation to $1 million per day for a “knowing violation” (adjusted annually to reflect inflation). Whether an enforcement agency must seek Dodd-Frank penalties or may be obtained by consumers in private actions is an open question courts may someday decide. 

Jonathan Foxx, Ph.D., MBA
Chairman & Managing Director 
Lenders Compliance Group


[i] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024)

[ii] 12 USC §§ 2605(d) and 2614

[iii] 12 USC §§ 2607(d) and 2614

[iv] 12 USC §§ 2608(b) and 2614

[v] 12 USC §§ 2609(d)

[vi] Indeed, a rather convoluted view suggested that the CFPB should implement the TILA disclosure requirements in Regulation Z and the RESPA disclosure requirements in Regulation X in order to discourage litigation invoking TILA’s liability scheme for RESPA violations.

[vii] Regulation Z § 1026.19(a)

[viii] Regulation Z § 1026.18

[ix] For example, the Consumer Handbook on Adjustable Rate Mortgages (CHARM) Booklet and ARM Program Disclosure requirements of Regulation Z § 1026.19(b) continue to apply as they did prior to the TRID Rule.

[x] A recent decision by a federal district court in Texas illustrates this issue. Bassett v. PHH Mortgage, 2024 U.S. Dist. (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2024) (magistrate recommendation), approved and case dismissed by 2024 U.S. Dist. (July 16, 2024). Note: This litigation determined, in particular, that 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(f) and 2614 do not create private causes of action, nor does RESPA provide private causes of action for violations of Regulation X §§ 1024.35 and 1024.39. As support, the court cited several other decisions within its district. The court acknowledged that Regulation X § 1024.41, “unlike the other RESPA provisions at issue…expressly provides for a private right of action.”

[xi] Op. cit. i

[xii] Op. cit. x

Thursday, April 25, 2024

Identifying a Qualified Written Request

QUESTION 

We are a medium-sized servicer with a servicing portfolio in almost all jurisdictions in the United States. I am an attorney who heads the team evaluating Qualified Written Requests (QWR). We recognize there are specific elements to a QWR. However, sometimes, it feels like a judgment call to determine what is or is not a QWR. 

I often find myself taking deep dives into RESPA’s Regulation X and case law to interpret whether a letter from a borrower constitutes a QWR or a complaint, each with obviously different – though sometimes overlapping – resolution criteria and statutory obligations. There are many instances where the letter is both a QWR and a complaint. 

My focus is on determining whether we have received a bona fide QWR. I was wondering if you could provide some guidance in navigating this legal jungle and provide a case that shows how a court has offered a way to identify a QWR. 

What constitutes the requirements for a Qualified Written Request? 

Is there a case with some guidelines for identifying a Qualified Written Request? 

COMPLIANCE SOLUTION 

Policies and Procedures 

ANSWER 

You have asked a question that involves one of the more litigious areas of servicing compliance. The Qualified Written Request (QWR) provisions of RESPA continue to produce an abundance of litigation. 

Generally, the court decisions typically use the more general statutory term QWR as they consider borrower claims regarding Notices of Error (NOEs) and Requests for Information (RFIs), the specific types of QWRs described in Regulation X[i].

Before proceeding with a possible case for you to consider, allow me to put down some foundation. 

RESPA[ii] specifies that 

“[d]uring the 60-day period beginning on the date of the servicer’s receipt from any borrower of a qualified written request relating to a dispute regarding the borrower’s payments, a servicer may not provide information regarding any overdue payment, owed by such borrower and relating to such period or qualified written request, to any credit reporting agency.” 

Similarly, Regulation X[iii] provides that, after receiving an NOE, a servicer may not, for 60 days, furnish adverse information to any consumer reporting agency regarding any payment that is the subject of the notice of error. 

This does not limit or restrict a servicer or lender from pursuing any remedy under applicable law, including initiating foreclosure or proceeding with a foreclosure sale, except for the Regulation X restrictions regarding assertions of errors relating to: 

(a) a first notice or filing required by applicable law for any judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure process in violation of Regulation X[iv]; or 

(b) a motion for foreclosure judgment or order of sale or conducting a foreclosure in violation of Regulation X[v]. 

Now, let's move on to a case that may be responsive to your inquiry. 

On remand from a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, a federal district court in Maryland recently considered whether a borrower inquiry was a QWR and, if it were, then whether the servicer had violated the restriction on furnishing adverse information to a consumer credit reporting agency. The case is Morgan v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc.[vi] 

Here’s my outline. 

·       In 1998, Morgan borrowed from Nations Bank to refinance his home mortgage loan. Morgan modified the mortgage loan once to change the date of his monthly payment. 

·       In November 2014, after the loan matured, servicing was transferred from Bank of America to Caliber. At the time of the transfer, the loan documents showed an outstanding balance due on the loan. Morgan repeatedly contacted Caliber about the purported outstanding loan balance. 

·       Morgan learned through an employer-generated credit check that his credit report reflected a $16,806 arrearage on the loan. The employer told Morgan he needed to correct the adverse credit reports or he would lose opportunities for job promotions. 

·       Over the next year, Morgan continued receiving notices regarding the outstanding balance. 

·       On September 20, 2016, Morgan called Caliber to inquire about the notices because he believed the loan had been paid off. He learned during that call that the balance had increased to $30,656.89. 

·       On September 25, 2016, he sent Caliber a letter stating: 

o   “I called Caliber and talked to [an employee]…he stated I owe $36,656.89…Can you please correct your records. Your office’s reporting this wrong amount to this credit agency is effecting [sic] my employment. Please correct your records.” 

·       Caliber received the letter and responded in writing the next day. 

·       In its October 4, 2016 letter, Caliber acknowledged receipt and stated it would “perform the necessary research and respond within the time period required by law.” 

·       Two days later, Caliber determined that the previously reported loan balance was incorrect. It recalculated the balance as $8,823. 

o   That same day, Caliber reported the new balance information to the credit reporting agencies using an Automated Universal Data form (AUD). 

·       Caliber also suspended its monthly report to the credit reporting agencies regarding the loan from October 6, 2016 through March 2017.

·       On October 11, 2016, Caliber informed Morgan that the credit report was “inaccurately reporting the amount past due.” 

o   The letter vaguely referred to Caliber having corrected the inaccuracy. Still, it did not explain what was inaccurate and how that error was corrected, and it did not share with Morgan that, in Caliber’s view, he still owed $8,823 on the loan.

o   The letter added that it might take up to four weeks before the “correct information” would appear in his credit report. 

·       Morgan continued to dispute that he owed anything and sent letters to the credit reporting agencies. According to Morgan, the notice from his employer regarding his poor credit and the dispute regarding the outstanding balance caused him emotional distress. 

·       On September 23, 2019, he sued Caliber for violating RESPA and Regulation X. 

The district court dismissed Morgan’s claim, holding that his September 25, 2016 letter did not meet RESPA’s requirements for a QWR. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit reversed, finding that the letter was a QWR. 

On remand, Morgan moved for partial summary judgment as to liability only, and Caliber filed a cross motion for summary judgment as to liability and damages. 

The district court granted Morgan’s motion as to two of the three elements of the RESPA claim (QWR, and failure to refrain from credit reporting, but not as to damages). It granted Caliber’s motion as to the unavailability of statutory damages. 

Now, I want to break the foregoing decision into its three elements: QWR, Failure to Refrain, and Actual Damages. Thereafter, I will provide a few words about statutory damages. 

QWR 

First, the court concluded, as required by the 4th Circuit, that the letter was a QWR because it was “a written correspondence” that articulated a “statement of reasons” in “sufficient detail” to indicate to Caliber why Morgan believed the credit reporting was in error. The court granted summary judgment to Morgan on this element. 

Failure to Refrain 

Second, the parties did not dispute that within 3 days of receiving the QWR, Caliber submitted an AUD informing the credit reporting agencies that Morgan had $8,823 outstanding, and that this qualified as reporting an “overdue payment.” Accordingly, Caliber indisputably failed to refrain from reporting “any overdue payment” for 60 days after having received the QWR. The court also granted summary judgment to Morgan on this element. 

Actual Damages 

Third, the court determined that Morgan had produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that he suffered emotional distress as a result of the AUD Caliber sent to the credit reporting agencies. 

The mother of Morgan’s children had observed that Morgan was “worried and anxious,” which was “unlike Morgan.” When she asked what was troubling him, he would “almost always turn to Caliber.” His daughter recalled that while living with Morgan during this time, he was “anxious about Caliber hurting his financial status,” Morgan “regularly paced around,” he was “short tempered,” and could not eat. Morgan also sought medical assistance for his anxiety and depression. 

From this testimony, a juror could reasonably conclude that he suffered emotional distress due to Caliber’s failure to refrain from reporting adverse information in the AUD. This left a facial issue as to whether Caliber’s RESPA violation proximately caused Morgan’s emotional distress. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment for Caliber as to actual damages. 

Statutory Damages 

Morgan also sought statutory damages, which RESPA allows when a servicer engages in a “pattern or practice of noncompliance” with RESPA. 

Morgan argued that Caliber’s single AUD constituted a pattern or practice because Caliber had forwarded it to three credit reporting agencies and violated multiple RESPA provisions. 

Not so, said the court, because Caliber submitted only one AUD on one occasion. If this alone were sufficient to establish a pattern or practice, then the pattern or practice requirement sufficient to trigger statutory damages would apply in almost every case. The court granted summary judgment to Caliber regarding statutory damages. 

I will conclude with an observation. 

The court noted that Morgan might wish to pursue an alternative argument that Caliber violated Regulation X[vii], which requires a servicer to respond to an NOE by either correcting the error and providing written notification of the correction, or conducting a reasonable investigation and providing a written notice that no error occurred. Thus, a legitimate argument could be made that Caliber did not satisfy the notification requirement, that is, it did not describe the error, how it was corrected, or the effective date of the correction. 

Jonathan Foxx, Ph.D., MBA
Chairman & Managing Director 
Lenders Compliance Group


[i] Regulation X §§ 1024.35 (NOEs) and 1024.36 (RFIs), as amended by the 2013 Mortgage Lending Rules.

[ii] See RESPA § 6

[iii] § 1024.35

[iv] § 1024.41(f) or (g)

[v] §1024.41(g) or (j)

[vi] Morgan v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2024)

[vii] § 1024.35(e)(1)(i)(B)